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The Department of Defense (DoD) is at risk of being unable to meet its operational requirements. Ongoing budget and manpower reductions, combined with equipment recapitalization and increasing operational demands, present a situat...
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The Department of Defense (DoD) is at risk of being unable to meet its operational requirements. Ongoing budget and manpower reductions, combined with equipment recapitalization and increasing operational demands, present a situation that may become untenable to match finite resources against ballooning requirements. Fortunately, with the problem identified, many have begun seeking new and innovative ideas to overcome operational shortfalls. However, not many DoD leaders have considered utilizing the Reserve Component (RC) to support federal operations while in a training status. Historical precedence and legal restrictions have, until recently, kept RC training separate from operational missions. The laws and policies now allow and advocate utilizing the RC to augment operations while in a training status, but DoD must consolidate and codify guidance to institutionalize the RC Training/Operations Program. The program will help meet DoD operational requirements in a declining budget environment, alleviate stress on the active force, and, provide an as of yet unconsidered opportunity to hone and maintain RC wartime skills. Implementing the program inside the Defense Intelligence Community (IC) could net an additional 1,800 man-years of operational capacity per fiscal year. Once instituted, gaining access to RC at rest capacity will reap significant benefits across DoD. Turning this at rest capacity into effective strength gains is very inexpensive and easily within the department s grasp.
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The unsolved problem of pretrained individual manpower has been characterized as the greatest failure of the AVF. While this is an accurate statement, it is not a complete diagnosis. There also was a problem with pretrained indivi...
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The unsolved problem of pretrained individual manpower has been characterized as the greatest failure of the AVF. While this is an accurate statement, it is not a complete diagnosis. There also was a problem with pretrained individual manpower during the draft years. While there were large numbers of people in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) then, they were not managed, trained, or available for immediate service, and it is unlikely that a rapid full mobilization could have been supported. The reduced strengths brought about by the end of the short term active duty periods have required the DoD to pay attention to the IRR, bring other sources of pretrained individuals into a state of availability, and devote some attention and money to the problem. In that sense, the advent of the AVF has contributed positively to solving the problem. It appears also that actions already taken and underway will provide a satisfactory solution in the future, provided that some plans are made for the use of veterans as an interim measure, the IRR improves in strength and training, and that a hardline reporting policy is maintained.
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This bibliography provides those with access to the Combined Arms Research Library a starting point in the search for information relating to the mobilization and integration of reserve forces during national emergencies in the tw...
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This bibliography provides those with access to the Combined Arms Research Library a starting point in the search for information relating to the mobilization and integration of reserve forces during national emergencies in the twentieth century. Reserve components played a significant, and in some cases paramount, role in the national defense during this period. Nonetheless, the process of reserve mobilization that formed the massive military establishments of World Wars I and II are little understood today by those responsible for utilizing reservists in future emergencies requiring the total force. With few exceptions, the historical examples cited in this bibliography concern the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. Titles relating to the role of the reserves in the scheme of national defense, however, relate to all the services. Most of the items included in this bibliography relate only to premobilization structures and plans, call-ups, and the integration of soldiers into standing forces. Combat actions of reserve units are included only as parts of general works.
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During Operation Desert Shield/Storm a category of Reserve Soldiers who departedactive duty or Reserve unit duty within the preceding 12 months of the operation, were mobilized to meet critical or anticipated shortages. These sold...
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During Operation Desert Shield/Storm a category of Reserve Soldiers who departedactive duty or Reserve unit duty within the preceding 12 months of the operation, were mobilized to meet critical or anticipated shortages. These soldiers exceeded everyone's expectations. Although these soldiers are not part of an official program they have become an important element for future rapid mobilizations. There are many lessons learned from this RT-12 mobilization which will enhance future deployments. As the Army downsizes it is more important than ever that we maximize our use of personnel resources and promote the Total Army concept.
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As Active Army end strength declines and policy makers favor operationally relevant Army Reserve Components, Army planners and lawmakers must consider employing Army National Guard and Army Reserve units in enduring missions, such...
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As Active Army end strength declines and policy makers favor operationally relevant Army Reserve Components, Army planners and lawmakers must consider employing Army National Guard and Army Reserve units in enduring missions, such as the Sinai or Kosovo, and in overseas partnership exercises. Over the past thirteen years Army Reserve Component units have deployed on numerous occasions and developed leaders and soldiers who are more ready for future mobilizations and deployments than their predecessors of the 19th and 20th centuries. To maintain this level of Reserve Component readiness, the Army must continue employing these units in overseas operations to maintain unit readiness and leader proficiency and relevance. To do this, Congress will need to provide the Army with budget predictability, enabling the Army to fund the additional pay and allowances associated with mobilizing Reserve Component units for overseas missions. This flexibility will allow the Army to meet ongoing mission requirements, while minimizing the risk involved with tying Active Army forces in those ongoing missions instead of having those units available to meet crisis situations in Korea, Eastern Europe, or Africa. If national leaders desire to avoid over-stressing the Active Army and maintain reserve component readiness, they should resource the operational reserve that they profess to desire.
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This report presents the effects of Total Force Policy on DoD's wartime logistics support structure. The Reserve Component now has a major responsibility for many critical logistics functions. The DoD cannot deploy and receive the...
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This report presents the effects of Total Force Policy on DoD's wartime logistics support structure. The Reserve Component now has a major responsibility for many critical logistics functions. The DoD cannot deploy and receive the surge of combat units into a theater nor support those units already in place without an immediate and significant infusion of Guard and Reserve logistics units.
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Two investigations involving 148 U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers were conducted to examine the capability of the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) (BeamHit, 1999) to support rifle marksmanship sustainment training and pr...
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Two investigations involving 148 U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers were conducted to examine the capability of the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) (BeamHit, 1999) to support rifle marksmanship sustainment training and predict record fire qualification scores. In both investigations, LMTS was used to support realistic/comprehensive rifle marksmanship instruction, identify soldiers in need of remedial training, and deliver that training when needed, prior to qualification firing. Some evidence was also found to suggest that LMTS-based training can improve record fire qualification rates, and that qualification performance on LMTS can be used to predict qualification performance on the live-fire range. Follow-up research is underway to assess the validity of these latter two notions.
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